

Security Levels

Level Definitions

- *Project-level requirements*
 - Level 0: None
 - Level 1: CII Passing badge
 - Including no critical and high known vulnerabilities > 60 days old
 - Level 2: CII Silver badge, plus:
 - All internal/external system communications shall be able to be encrypted.
 - All internal/external service calls shall have common role-based access control and authorization using CADI framework.
 - Level 3: CII Gold badge

ONAP Platform-level requirements per release

- Level 1: 70 % of the projects passing the level 1
 - with the non-passing projects reaching 80% passing level
 - Non-passing projects MUST pass specific cryptography criteria outlined by the Security Subcommittee*
- Level 2: 70 % of the projects passing silver
 - with non-silver projects:
 - completed passing level and 80% towards silver level
 - internal/external system communications shall be able to be encrypted
- Level 3: 70% of the projects passing gold
 - with non-gold projects achieving silver level and achieving 80% towards gold level
- Level 4: 100 % passing gold.

Minimum Levels

- Platform Level 2
- Additional recommendations:
 - All projects **SHOULD** migrate from the Jackson Data Processor packages to the GSON packages unless the Jackson dependency is inherited from an outside project such as ODL.
 - All projects **SHOULD** provide the ability to turn on and turn off Secure communication. Secure communication is on by default.

Guidance for Implementation

- Refer to the Security Subcommittee

Contacts

- Refer to the Security Subcommittee

*Specific cryptography requirements for security level 1:

- The software produced by the project **MUST** use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used).
- If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it **SHOULD** only call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it **SHOULD NOT** re-implement its own.
- The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project **MUST** use default key lengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It **MUST** be possible to configure the software so that smaller key lengths are completely disabled.
- The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project **MUST NOT** depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5, single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG) or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context (e.g., ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it reveals identical blocks within the cipher text as demonstrated by the [ECB penguin](#), and CTR mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated).
- The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project **SHOULD NOT** depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH).
- If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords **MUST** be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2, Bcrypt or Scrypt).