Versions Compared

Key

  • This line was added.
  • This line was removed.
  • Formatting was changed.

POC Definition

Architectural Evaluation of AAF

Function

ONAP Today

Service Mesh

Risk

Authentication (Enforcement)

Password Authn

  • Performed by AAF
  • Performed locally
  • Uniform implementation

ONAP

Today

risk:

  • Difficult to manage
  • Showstopper for commercial use
PKI-based Authn
  • Limited support from AAF and project teams

Certificate Management

  • Performed by AAF
  • Performed locally
  • Each component must manage its certificates
  • init container obtains from AAF certman and puts the certificate in the volume
  • Uniform implementation
  • Managed by Sidecar
  • Strongly recommends the use of ingress controller instead of node port
  • cert manager project is the typical way of managing certificates in K8S
  • cert manager is separate from Service Mesh (https://github.com/jetstack/cert-manager)
  • Service Mesh designed to deliver the certificate to the pod (sidecar)
    • Internal communication: citadel certificates
    • External communication: cert manager delivers cert to the ingress controller

ONAP risk:

  • projects must manage certificates
  • AAF certman must be supported by AAF

Istio risk:

  • cert manager not support CMPv2
  • must enable Istio to obtain certificates from an external CA
  • must manage two levels of certificates
  • must disable all application level authentication

Authorization (Enforcement)

  • Performed by AAF
  • Performed locally
  • Uniform implementation
  • OAuth can provide the token (claims) to the application

Istio risk:

RBAC (Enforcement)

  • Supported by AAF
  • AAF RBAC is not widely used by ONAP projects
RBAC
  • Access decisions based on URL and request header content (includes a JWT)
  • Keycloak or other OpenID Connect compatible service to manage roles and issue JWT token
  • JWT token can be used both within the the Service Mesh and on the Ingress Controller
  • Provides extensible architecture to support decisions based on content in the body
  • https://istio.io/docs/tasks/security/authorization/authz-jwt/

AAF risk:

  • custom solution with limited open source community support

Confidentiality on External Interfaces (Encrypted transport)

  • Performed by AAF
  • Performed locally

AAF risk:

  • per project work and understanding of init containers and AAF certman
  • Not integrated with K8S
Confidentiality on Internal Interfaces (Encrypted transport)
  • Performed by AAF
  • Performed locally
  • Can issue the certificates for both internal and external communication
  • Performed by Service Mesh
  • Service Mesh assigns an identity (spiffe https://spiffe.io/)
    to every pod
  • Service Mesh uses Citadel for certificate management, using the spiffe identity

ONAP risk:

  • per project work and understanding of init containers and AAF certman
  • no distinction between internal and external communication in current deployment

Service Mesh risk:

  • need to be using at least Istio 1.5 for Citadel support

User Management (Information Store)

  • Part of AAF
  • Part of each project
ONAP Today
  • Can use KeyCloak (or other openID Connect service) to manage manage users centrally
  • KeyCloak can be integrated with an identity provider

ONAP risk:

  • AAF user/passwords not stored in user store
  • AAF has complicated user store management
  • Non-uniform solution is difficult to manage
  • Showstopper for commercial use
  • Most Operators have an existing user store (commonly LDAP or Keberos)
  • Limited support from AAF and project teams

Certificate Management

see confidentiality

see confidentiality


TCP and UDP support

  • TCP supported
  • UDP not supported
  • TCP supported
  • UDP supported

DCAE (SNMP trap collector)

ONAP Today:

DCAE

uses UDP for data collection (SNMP)

Service Mesh would not change the security posture of ONAP use of UDP

Authentication could be implemented as a sidecar plugin, but would require custom work

Logging

  • The application has responsibility for transactional logging
  • Multiple solutions have been adopted by the projects (ONAP Logging, AAF-CADI, natively in application)
  • Some components running a sidecar that runs an application called filebeat that sends log files to ELK Stack (Logging) or ESSK
  • Logging project has not participated in the past two releases
  • Some components log to stdout
  • ONAP logging is customized
  • AAF provides logging capabilities
  • ONAP and Acumos logging projects have a common definition
  • Transactional events are logged by AAF-CADI, if integrated
  • Service Mesh could be integrated with ONAP Logging
  • Transactional events can be logged by Service Mesh instead of by the application
  • Collects the events to a centralized location
  • Consistent source of log data across all projects and requires no work from projects to collect the data

ONAP Today:

  • ONAP Logging is not actively maintained

Service Mesh:

API Tracing

  • provided by each application
  • Need an inventory of how each ONAP application is using AAF


Monitoring and Alarming

  • POMBA was the analytics logging analytics service and is in the process of being deprecated and removed from ONAP
  • ONAP logs can be ingested into an SIEM tool
  • ONAP does not provide native monitoring and alarming for the ONAP components
  • Service Mesh integrates natively with FluentD (CNCF open source data aggregation solution)
  • Logs can be ingested into SIEM tool
  • Service Mesh collects information about ingress and egress traffic, including authentication
  • Neither ONAP nor Service Mesh provide native monitoring and alarming functionality

Performance

  • CADI is part of the application container
  • sidecars are separate containers
  • Proxy must be running in order to route transactions to the destination service outside the pod
  • Sidecar may have impact on throughput (adds 3ms of delay)
  • Sidecar may increase the ONAP resource requirements (potentially 3G for a full ONAP deployment)

Integration

  • Enforcement of AN/AZ requires code development
  • AAF CADI only supports Java
  • Certificate management via certman mostly language independent (uses AAFinit container to put cert into volume) supports P12 and JKS, no PEM format. ONAP containers retrieve the cert from the volume.
  • AAF was not designed to be run on containers
  • Language independent
  • CA and certificate management external to ONAP
  • No code maintenance by ONAP
  • Cloud Native solution

ONAP Today:

  • Third party microservices require modification (modification may not be possible)
  • Cannot use the ONAP microservice independently
  • CA is part of ONAP, not external
  • If AAF fails during deployment, the ONAP containers cannot retrieve a certificate

Service Mesh:

  • external dependency that must be supported by integration and testing teams
  • external dependency that must be provided by an ONAP user

Layer 7 load balancing

  • AAF does not perform load balancing
Integration with Ingress

https://istio.io/docs/concepts/traffic-management/



draw.io Diagram
bordertrue
diagramNameONAPCurrentState
simpleViewerfalse
width
linksauto
tbstyletop
lboxtrue
diagramWidth451
revision2