1 Introduction

This section captures recommendations for handling certain security questions that are studied by the security sub-committee.  These recommendations, when implemented, can lead to new best practices.  The recommendation states are:

• Draft: The ONAP Security sub-committee is working on the recommendation
• Recommended: The ONAP security sub-committee agrees that this is a recommendation
• Approved: The recommendation is approved by the TSC.

The main captured topics are are:

1. ONAP  Credential Management
2. static code scanning

2 ONAP Credential Management.

 Status: Draft

2.1 Credentials to be managed

Credentials may be certificates, passwords and the like.  These need to be managed through the entire lifecycle.  The types of credentials that need to be managed are:

• • Credentials for ONAP users to access ONAP.  These are referred to as ONAP_USER credentials.
  • Credentials for using the APIs exposed by ONAP. These are referred to as ONAP_ExtAPI credentials.
  • Credentials for ONAP to communicate to other ONAP components.  These are referred to as ONAP Component credentials.
    • Note: This includes credentials for VNF SDK to package the artefacts onboarded into SDC.
  • Credentials for ONAP to communicate with other systems.  These are referred to as ONAP_Foreign credentials.
    • As an example, if ONAP is to communicate to an external SDN controller or a cloud infrastructure, these credentials need to be managed.

2.2 Credential Lifecycle

It is useful to consider the lifecycle of the credentials.  This section describes the considered lifecycle steps of the credentials (note the usage of the credentials are out-of-scope of the credential management):

• Credential Creation
  • The credentials are created.  The means to create the credentials is considered out-of-scope from ONAP and an existing credential creation scheme is used. 
    Note: The credentials may be created by a CA. (binding an identity to a credential using the X.509v3 certificate)
• Credential Provisioning 
  • Provisioning the credentials involves putting the credentials into the ONAP system, ensuring that they are securily stored. (PKCS11 secure generation and storage of private key)
• Credential Update 
  • The credentials that have been previously provisioned are updated. 
• Credential Validation 
  • The validation of provisioned credentials to ensure that the credentials are still valid. 
• Credential Distribution 
  • The distribution of the credentials so that they are accessable to the ONAP functions.
    Note: this implies no statement on the means to distribute the credentials.
  • Note: For discussin - is (or should) this state visible in the lifecycle ?
• Credential Expiration
  • The credential has been expired and is no longer considered valid. 
•  Credential Revoke
  • The ability to revoke and remove a credential

2.3 Credential Management Input Requirements

The credential management solution considers the following:

• The credential management solution must be able to interact with existing credential creation and validation schemes
   

2.4 ONAP Credential Management Overview

ONAP requires two components to improve the security of credentials used in orchestration.

1. 1. a secrets vault to store credentials used by ONAP
   2. a process to instantiate credentials

Component 1: Secrets Vault - A service that can be integrated with ONAP that provides secure storage of the credentials used by ONAP to authenticate to VNFs.

Use Cases:

 For ONAP_User Credentials

For ONAP_User Credentials, two uses cases are shown.

1. provisioning the credentials

<< Insert here >>

2. Authenticating a user.

<< Insert here >>

For  ONAP_ExtAPI credentials:

For ONAP_ExtAPI credentials, 3 use cases are shown.

 1. Provisioning the credentials 

<< insert here >>

 2. Distributing the credentials

<< Insert here >>

3. Retrieving the credentials

<< Insert here >>

For ONAP_Component credentials:

1. Provisioning the credentials

<< insert here >>

2. Retrieving the credentials to use for external communication

<< Insert here >> 

For ONAP_Foreign credentials:

NOTE to seccom: Probably should describe how this works for all lifecycle steps. 

Recommendation: ONAP should provide a reference implementation of a secrets vault service as an ONAP project.

Next Steps:

• • Find a project lead for a reference implementation.

Component 2: A process to provision ONAP instances with credentials. These credentials may be used for interprocess communication (e.g., APPC calling A&AI) or for ONAP configuring VNFs.

Automatic provisioning of certificates and credentials to ONAP components: AAF can provision certificates. ECOMP DCAE is currently using AAF to provision certificates.

Next steps:

• • Work with the AAF team to include this functionality in Release 2. It is important to understand that the AAF solution depends on the CA supporting the SCEP protocol.
  • Enhance AAF to provision userIDs & passwords to ONAP instances and VNFs. Most VNFs only support userID/password authentication today. ETSI NFV SEC may issue a spec in the future on a more comprehensive approach to using PKI for NFV which can be visited by ONAP SEC when released. Steve is working on this right now but doesn’t know when he’ll be done.

2.3 Recommended approach

2.4 Implications to the ONAP

Describe what this means to ONAP

QUESTIONS:

3 ONAP Static Code Scans

Status: Draft

3.1 ONAP Static Code Scanning

The purpose of the ONAP static code scanning is perform static code scans of the code as it is introduced into the ONAP repositories looking for vulnerabilities.

3.2 Approaches

Tools that have been assessed: Coverity Scan (LF evaluation), HP Fortify (AT&T evaluation), Checkmarx (AT&T evaluation), Bandit (AT&T evaluation)

Prelimary Decision: Coverity Scan https://scan.coverity.com/

<< Include a motivation >>

Description: Coverity Scan is a service by which Synopsys provides the results of analysis on open source coding projects to open source code developers that have registered their products with Coverity Scan. Coverity Scan is powered by Coverity® Quality Advisor. Coverity Quality Advisor surfaces defects identified by the Coverity Static Analysis Verification Engine (Coverity SAVE®). Synopsys offers the results of the analysis completed by Coverity Quality Advisor on registered projects at no charge to registered open source developers.

Current Activity: In conversations with Coverity to understand the definition of “project” – does it refer to ONAP or the projects under an ONAP release to ensure that the limitation on free scans does not lead to bottlenecks in submissions and commits.

Open Source use: 4000+ open source projects use Coverity Scan

Frequency of builds:

Up to 28 builds per week, with a maximum of 4 builds per day, for projects with fewer than 100K lines of code

Up to 21 builds per week, with a maximum of 3 builds per day, for projects with 100K to 500K lines of code

Up to 14 builds per week, with a maximum of 2 build per day, for projects with 500K to 1 million lines of code

Up to 7 builds per week, with a maximum of 1 build per day, for projects with more than 1 million lines of code

Once a project reaches the maximum builds per week, additional build requests will be rejected. You will be able to re-submit the build request the following week.

Languages supported: C/C++, C#, Java, Javascript, Python, Ruby

Question: How to trigger the code scan from Jenkins?

→ Jenkis plug in?

→ what API does Coverity offer

Question: What about Go? which versions of Phython.

Comment: Add some motivation of why Coverity is a good idea.

Comment: We need to catch the commitment now. 

Comment: OPNFV also has a basic gerrit plug in for some basic scans.  This can be brought in.

Bring in a few prposals to the TSC.

3.3 Recommendation

Capture the recommendation here

4. CII Badging process Learnings for ONAP.

Status: Draft

4.1 CII Badging process intro

This section captures the learning's of using the CII badging program in ONAP.

4.2 Learnings

The CLAMP project has been working as the CII badging certification.  Their feedback is found here: CII Badging Program - Feedback.  This is repeated below for simplicity:

4.2.1 CII Badging program introduction.

• Core Infrastructure Initiative Website:
-https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/

• Evaluate how projects follow best practices using voluntary self-certification

• Three levels: Passing, Silver and Gold

• LF target level recommendation is Gold

• ONAP Pilot Project: CLAMP
-https://bestpractices.coreinfrastructure.org/projects/1197

4.2.2 The Questionnaire

• Edition is limited to a subset of users

• Main editor can nominate other users as editors

• Divided into clear sections
 - For each section, a set of questions is provided, addressing best practices relating to the parent section

• Each question asks if a criterion is

• Met, unmet, not applicable, or unknown

• Criteria are generally high-level as targeted to best practices, e.g.

• “The project MUST have one or more mechanisms for discussion”
• “The project SHOULD provide documentation in English”

4.2.3 The Goals

• Give confidence in the project being delivered

• By quickly knowing what the project supports

• See what should be improved

• Self-questioning helps project stakeholders identifying strengths and weaknesses, do’s and don'ts

• Align all projects using the same ratings

• Makes projects connected together to follow the same practices

• Call for continuous improvement

• Increase self rating and reach better software quality

4.2.4 Raised Questions

• Introduce test coverage rules: how many tests should be added for each code changes
• Digital signature: use digital signature in delivered packages (already in the plan?)
• Vulnerability fixing SLA: vulnerabilities should be fixed within 60 days
• Security mechanisms
  • Which cryptographic algorithms to use to encrypt password
  • The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD implement perfect forward secrecy for key agreement protocols so a session key derived from a set of long-term keys cannot be compromised if one of the long-term keys is compromised in the future.
  • If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2, Bcrypt or Scrypt).
  • The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST generate all cryptographic keys and nonces using a cryptographically secure random number generator, and MUST NOT do so using generators that are cryptographically insecure

5 ONAP Communication Security

Status: Draft

5.1 ONAP Communication Security

Assuming the credential management is in place, ONAP needs to have a common means to support secure communication between the onap components.

There are two high level use cases to cover.

1. Real-time communication between ONAP components
2. Support for authentication and encryption of the modules and packages to be onboarded into SDK (from VNF SDK). 

 5.2 ONAP communication security requirements

To guide the solution development for the ONAP communication security, the following requirements are identified:

For: Real-time communication between ONAP components:

• The solution  MUST support an approach that can be common to all onap modules.
• The solution MUST support the credential management solution and MUST NOT be tied to any particular credential management scheme.
• The solution MUST support secure communication between the ONAP components in the following sense:
  • A receiving ONAP component understands that the message is authentic
  • Any element in between the ONAP components cannot interpret or change the message.
• The solution MUST enable that a sending ONAP component does not rely on what the receiving ONAP component is, and the receiving ONAP component does not rely on what the sending ONAP component is.  (This would put unnecessary restraints on the architecture).
• The solution SHOULD be easy for the ONAP components to Adopt.
• The solution MUST be independent of the underlying communication technology (i.e. communication buss technologies).

For models and packages to be onboarded:

• The solution MUST support the credential management solution and MUST NOT be tied to any particular credential management scheme.
• The soluction MUST allow Service Design and Creation to validate the package from a security perspective. 

6 (tmp) input to the S3P (carrier grade) discussions from a security perspective

Status: Draft

Note: This will be removed when the feedback is sent back.

The full list of the needs can be found at:  https://wiki.onap.org/plugins/servlet/mobile?contentId=1015829#content/view/15998867 

Security:

Per project:

• Level 0: None
• Level 1: CII Passing badge
• Level 2: CII Silver badge, plus:
  • All internal/external system communications shall be able to be encrypted.
  • All internal/external service calls shall have common role-based access control and authorization.
• Level 3: CII Gold badge 

Note: When creating the CII project entry, it is recommended to use ONAP in the title to facilitate searching the onap projects.

Per Release:

• Level 1 70% of the projects included in the release at passing badge level
• with non-passing projects reaching 80% towards passing level.
• Non passing projects MUST pass these specific criteria:
  • The software produced by the project MUST use, by default, only cryptographic protocols and algorithms that are publicly published and reviewed by experts (if cryptographic protocols and algorithms are used).
  • If the software produced by the project is an application or library, and its primary purpose is not to implement cryptography, then it SHOULD only       call on software specifically designed to implement cryptographic functions; it SHOULD NOT re-implement its own.
  • The security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST use default keylengths that at least meet the NIST minimum requirements       through the year 2030 (as stated in 2012). It MUST be possible to configure the software so that smaller keylengths are completely       disabled.
  • The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project MUST NOT depend on broken cryptographic algorithms (e.g., MD4, MD5,       single DES, RC4, Dual_EC_DRBG) or use cipher modes that are inappropriate to the context (e.g., ECB mode is almost never appropriate because it       reveals identical blocks within the ciphertext as demonstrated by the ECB penguin, and CTR  mode is often inappropriate because it does not perform authentication       and causes duplicates if the input state is repeated).
  • The default security mechanisms within the software produced by the project SHOULD NOT depend on cryptographic algorithms or modes with known serious       weaknesses (e.g., the SHA-1 cryptographic hash algorithm or the CBC mode in SSH).
  • If the software produced by the project causes the storing of passwords for authentication of external users, the passwords MUST be       stored as iterated hashes with a per-user salt by using a key stretching (iterated) algorithm (e.g., PBKDF2, Bcrypt or Scrypt).
• Level 2  70% of the projects in the release passing silver
  • with non-silver projects completed passing level and 80% towards silver level
• Level 3 70% of the projects included in the release passing gold
  • with non-gold projects achieving silver level and achieving 80% towards gold level
• Level 4: 100% of the projects in the release passing gold level. 

Examples of uses cases that people may want to see solved.

5. Examples of secure communication between ONAP components

6. Examples of security communiation between ONAP and other components.

7. User provisioning, and relation to access to other systems.

........