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Table of Contents

1. High Level Component Definition and Architectural Relationships (template)

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<< list the new capabilities that were introduced in this release, or a hot-link to the key features. New sub-chapter per release, as per a release notes document >> 

6. Security

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Conformance 

• ONAP Component Describe ONAP API and data security conformance 
  • Describe the component Service Mesh conformance / plan for secure communications, routing, etc. Use of AAF authentication and authorization configurations
    • Does the component have AAF dependencies? If so, describe the current dependencies and a migration plan to
    Service Mesh and new security architecture
  • Supporting of Authentication and Authorization
    • e.g., coarse-grained authorization support
    • e.g., fine-grained authorization support (how it is done?)
  • Data protection
    • Data at rest
    • new data storage location/mechanism
• Describe Logging conformance
  • Log field standards
  • User sensitive data
  • Logging destination STDOUT / STDERR conformance
  • What is new in logging capabilities
  • Identify data existing ; 
• Container Hardening: Configuration of Docker / Kubernetes; following the benchmark (hardening plan)
  • pen testing? 
  • non-root access. (e.g., container image needs privilege ??)
• SECCOM feedback:
• info: Pawel I'd like a few minutes to discuss logging (Python POC and Logging Arch)
  They need to look at the K8s hardening guide from NSA ;)
• Secure the Container Image repository
  Hashing function to identify images
  Digitally sign created images. Perform integrity check on images
  Limit access of containers
  Some things, like docker daemon, require root access. Others do not. Limit access and privileges where possible
  Limit access per container, depending on what the NF requires
  Linux Security Modules (LSM): fine grained control of user permissions
  Leverage “fence” services to limit access via host OS
  Namespaces, cgroups, etc. Segregate containers from other software on the host OS
  Leverage service mesh architecture
• confirmed, logs to STDOUT has been a Global Requirement since Jakarta.   REQ-441 LOGS MANAGEMENT - PHASE 1: COMMON PLACE FOR DATA.  Canonical List of TSC Best Practice and Global Requirements
• • • remove the dependancies
    • How does the component support authentication and authorization of its clients (Humans, other applications)?
  • Describe the component data protection
    
    • Data storage location/mechanism 
    • Data protection plan, such as data at rest, data-level access control, data in transit, others
    • User sensitive data handling (e.g., password)
• Describe the component / container hardening
  • The component must run as non-root-based users. Does the component use non-root-access only? Otherwise, describe the reasons and non-root-access support plans
  • Does the component container require privilege access/right? If so, describe the reasons and migration plans
  • Is the component image signed digitally for integrity? (TBD)
  • Does the component use the basic image to conform to the global requirement

    Jira
    server ONAP Jira serverId 425b2b0a-557c-3c0c-b515-579789cceedb key REQ-1073

  • Does the component follow the K8s hardening guide? e.g., from NSA, https://media.defense.gov/2022/Aug/29/2003066362/-1/-1/0/CTR_KUBERNETES_HARDENING_GUIDANCE_1.2_20220829.PDF 
• Describe the component logging conformance
  • Does the component conform to the Log field standards best practice,

    Jira
    server ONAP Jira serverId 425b2b0a-557c-3c0c-b515-579789cceedb key REQ-1072

    ? If not, please describe the reasons and support plans.
  • Does the component exclude user sensitive data (e.g., password, private key, other credentials) from logging? If not, please describe the reasons and support plans.
  • Does the component support the Logging destination STDOUT / STDERR conformance? If not, please describe the reasons and support plans.
• Documentation for the component security
  • Describe the component security architecture and conformance in the document.

• The project should fill out a ONAP Security Review Questionnaire Template and review it with SECCOM.
• The project should follow the CISA Memory Safe Code guidance, not to introduce memory unsafe code, joint-guidance-exploring-memory-safety-in-critical-open-source-projects-508c.pdf, The-Case-for-Memory-Safe-Roadmaps-508c.pdf7: General section: Documentation change for this new capability? 

7. Document Changes

8. References

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